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CASENOTE

To Serve and Protect: Thornton v. United
States and the Newly Anemic Fourth
Amendment

In Thornton v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
further weakened the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment2 by
holding that an officer may search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle incident to arrest even when the suspect is first approached after
exiting the vehicle. Under the guise of providing protection to police
officers, this decision greatly expands the power of an arresting officer
to search the private property of the arrestee and creates uncertainty on
what constitutional limits apply to searches incident to arrest outside
the home.

124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2132.
1.
2.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Deion Nichols, a police officer in Norfolk, Virginia, was driving an
unmarked police car while in uniform. Officer Nichols first noticed
Marcus Thornton when Thornton slowed his automobile to avoid driving
alongside the unmarked police car. Officer Nichols, suspicious of
Thornton's actions, pulled onto a side street and waited for Thornton to
pass. After Thornton passed, Officer Nichols ran Thornton's license
plates and found that the plates were registered to a Chevrolet two-door,
not the Lincoln Town Car that Thornton was driving. Thornton had
parked and exited the vehicle before Officer Nichols pulled him over.
The officer accosted Thornton, now some distance from his automobile,
asked him for his driver's license, and informed Thornton that he was
driving with plates that did not match the vehicle.'
Thornton was rambling and appeared nervous. His behavior caused
Officer Nichols to fear for his safety, so the officer inquired whether
there were any weapons or narcotics in the car or on Thornton's person.
Thornton said he was not in possession of weapons or narcotics. Officer
Nichols patted down Thornton, and the search produced two bags, one
containing crack cocaine, the other containing marijuana. Thornton was
handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the unmarked police car. The
officer then searched Thornton's vehicle and found a 9-millimeter
handgun under the driver's seat.5
Thornton was charged by a grand jury with possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm after having been
previously convicted of a felony. Thornton attempted to suppress the
evidence of the firearm, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.' The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
denied the motion to suppress and held that the search was valid under
New York v. Belton,' or in the alternative, it was valid because Officer
Nichols could have conducted an inventory search of the vehicle.'
Thornton was convicted, and he appealed. Thornton argued that Belton
was limited to cases in which the officer first contacted the arrestee
while the arrestee remained in the car. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision noting that the need to
disarm the arrestee and preserve precious evidence for trial did not limit
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 2129.
Id.
Id. at 2130.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
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Belton in the way Thornton argued.9 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari to address the issue of the limitations to the
search incident to arrest exception.' 0
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The critical issue in search incident to arrest cases is to what extent
can an arresting officer search the area around the arrestee. The
Supreme Court's record on this issue is not the model of consistency."
Starting in dictum in Weeks v. United States, 2 the Court approved of
warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest. " For more than fifty
years, the Court repeatedly switched between limiting and expanding
the authority of law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches
incident to a lawful arrest."'
A.

The Immediate Control Standard

The mercuric holdings of the Court acquired some steadfastness in
Following Chimel, when determining the
Chimel v. California.5
authority of an arresting officer to search the area around the arrestee,
the courts engage in a two-way balancing act. Courts weigh the
arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights against the concern for the officer's
safety, and the desire to protect evidence from destruction. 6
The Court's purpose in Chimel was to firmly establish the permissible
scope of warrantless searches incident to arrest. 7 The Court attempted
to identify to what extent an arresting officer could search the arrestee
and the area around the arrestee.'5 In Chimel police officers arrived
at Chimel's home with an arrest warrant for his burglary of a coin shop.

9. Id. at 2130.
10. Id. at 2129.
11. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969).
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755.
14. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709-10 (1948) (holding search was
illegal because agents had enough time to seek a search warrant); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 152 (1947) (allowing the warrantless search of arrestee's entire four room
apartment when he was arrested in his living room); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931) (holding that the search conducted during the arrest
was unlawful because no crime had been committed in the presence of the officers and the
officer had time to swear out a search warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158
(1925) (holding that both the person and the area can be searched in order to seize the
fruits of the crime).
15. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
16. Id. at 763-65.
17. Id. at 753.
18. Id.
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The officers knocked on the door and were admitted into the house by
Chimel's wife; there they waited for Chimel to return from work. When
Chimel entered his home the officers handed Chimel the arrest warrant
and asked if he would allow a search of the home. Over Chimel's
protests and without a search warrant, the officers proceeded to search
the entire three-bedroom home. The forty-five minute search produced
coins and several medals that were later admitted into evidence and
used to convict Chimel."9 The Court stated that to search areas not
occupied by the arrestee would require a search warrant.2 ° Along those
lines, the Court held that an arresting officer may search the arrestee
and the "area within his immediate control" for weapons and for
evidence that might be concealed or destroyed by the arrestee but could
not search a room apart from the one the arrestee occupied or even the
drawers located in the room in which the arrest took place.2 The
Court reasoned that to allow a search of areas outside of the arrestee's
control would too greatly infringe on Fourth Amendment
immediate
22
rights.

Throughout its opinion in Chimel, the Court emphasized the need to
protect arresting officers from harm, as weapons that are close by or
concealed can fall into the hands of the arrestee. s Implicit in the
concern for officer safety and evidence integrity was the assumption that
the arrestee was close enough to a weapon to employ it or close enough
to evidence to conceal or destroy it. The Court expressly indicated that
the reason the searches were allowed was to protect the officer and any
evidence from the arrestee.24 Therefore, there was no justification to
allow searches of areas to which the arrestee had no access.25 While
the standard set by Chimel did establish a more concrete standard for
search of the area incident to arrest, the Court stated: "the recurring
questions of reasonableness of searches depend upon the facts and
circumstances ...

of the case."26

The dependency upon facts and

circumstances became the ground for expansion of the rule established
in Chimel. Search of the arrestee's person incident to arrest had been
well established; the contention surrounded the issue of where to draw
the line for search of the area around the arrestee
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 753-54.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763-64.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id. at 765.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
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Search Authorized No Matter the Basis of the Arrest
In United States v. Robinson," the Court held that, so long as there
was a custodial arrest, a search of an arrestee was clearly authorized
even when the arresting officer did not express fear of physical harm or
destruction of evidence. 29 Robinson involved a police officer who
stopped defendant, Robinson, because he suspected Robinson of
operating an automobile after the revocation of his operator's permit.
When Robinson stopped his car and exited the vehicle, he was arrested.
Following department procedure, the arresting officer patted down
Robinson and found a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen
gelatin capsules of heroin. 0 Robinson contested the search and the
admission of the evidence it produced, claiming that the search violated
the Fourth Amendment.3 1
The Court once again explained that search incident to arrest, the
traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, allows for a search of the person of the arrestee following
a lawful arrest and a search of the area within the control of the
arrestee3 2 Rejecting Robinson's argument, the Court held that "all
custodial arrests [should be treated alike] for purposes of search
justification."33 The Court's holding was in effect an expansion of
Chimel.3 4 The Court expressly stated that it was not inclined to limit
the authority to search incident to arrest on the assumption that some
arrestee's, by nature of their offense, are more dangerous than others.35
If an arrest (on whatever ground) was lawful, the standard established
in Robinson always allowed a search.
B.

C. Automobile Bright-line Established
Nearly ten years later, in New York v. Belton, s6 the Court attempted
to establish a bright-line rule for the proper scope of the search of an
automobile interior incident to lawful arrest.37 Of course, such a search

of the passenger compartment after the arrest of the occupants would

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 220-23.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 235.
Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 459.
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require an extension of the rule established by Chimel because the
arrested former occupants would be out of the car, causing nothing in
the car to be within their immediate control. In Belton a police officer
in an unmarked car pulled over a speeding automobile occupied by four
men. While conducting the traffic stop, the police officer discovered that
none of the occupants owned the car. The officer also smelled burnt
marijuana, and with his suspicions aroused he instructed the occupants
to exit the vehicle and arrested them for marijuana possession. After
separating the occupants into four different areas, the police officer
patted them down and then searched the passenger compartment of the
vehicle. This search revealed marijuana in an envelope and cocaine in
the zipped pocket of a jacket located on the back seat of the car. The
evidence obtained in the warrantless search was used to convict the
owner of the jacket for criminal possession of a controlled substance.3"
In reaching its conclusion in Belton, the Court recognized that Chimel
established the principle that searches incident to arrest may not extend
beyond the area in the immediate control of the arrestee, but then stated
that Chimel's language had not provided a workable standard.3" If the
Court had limited itself to Chimel, the search would have been
problematic because the jacket was inaccessible to the arrestee at the
time of the search. Nevertheless, in an effort to ensure police officer
safety, the protection of evidence, and establish a workable standard for
police officers in the field, the Court considered the search valid. 40 The
Court held that after making a lawful custodial arrest of a car's
occupant, the officer may search the passenger compartment including
any containers and their contents present in the passenger compartment.4 1 In doing so, the Court created a legal fiction, which states
that everything within the passenger compartment is within the reach
or immediate control of an occupant. Police officers now had a brightline rule to follow; so long as the arrestee was an occupant of a vehicle,
the vehicle's passenger compartment could be searched for weapons and
evidence."

38. Id. at 455-56.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 460.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 460.
Id.
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D. Immediate Control StandardLimited to Instances Involving
Arrest
In Knowles v. Iowa,43 the Supreme Court, in an uncharacteristic and
unanimous decision, declined to extend the search incident to arrest
principles of Belton to a case in which the suspect was given a citation,
but not arrested. 4 In Knowles a police officer stopped a driver for
speeding and only issued him a citation although he could have lawfully
arrested the driver. After issuing the citation for speeding, the police
officer conducted a full search of the vehicle without the driver's consent.
This search revealed a bag of marijuana and a pipe used for smoking
marijuana. The objects were located under the driver's seat. The driver
was subsequently arrested and charged with violations of state laws
concerning controlled substances. At trial the driver moved to suppress
the evidence because the search was conducted without an arrest of the
driver. The evidence was admitted, and the Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed the driver's conviction.45
The United States Supreme Court held that neither of the historical
justifications for the search incident to arrest exception applied-(1)
disarming the arrestee in an effort to protect the arresting officer or (2)
the need to protect evidence for later use.46 The underlying policy of
protecting officers from threats to their safety simply was not sufficiently
present in issuing a traffic citation to allow a full search of a vehicle.47
The Court stated that much of the danger in a custodial arrest comes
from the extended period of time in which the arrestee and the arresting
officer were in each other's presence, especially when the officer
transported the arrestee to the police station.48 Once again the Court
weighed the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights against the policy of
protecting both the arresting officer and any evidence that might be used
at trial. In Knowles the scales tipped in favor of the arrestee.
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

The Supreme Court in Thornton v. United States,49 addressed a
variation of the question presented in Belton and extended the Belton
rule to circumstances in which a police officer does not initiate contact

43.

525 U.S. 113 (1998).

44. Id. at 118-19.
45.

Id. at 114-15.

46. Id. at 116-17.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 117.
Id.
124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
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with the arrestee until after the arrestee has exited his vehicle. 50 The
rule set forth in Belton states: "when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." 51 The majority approached Thornton as a
natural extension of the bright-line rule created by Belton. 2
The majority disregarded the attempts by Thornton to distinguish the
facts of his case from those of Belton and reasoned that the danger (both
to an arresting officer and to evidence) presented by an arrestee who was
standing beside his vehicle was for all practical purposes substantially
similar to the threat posed by an arrestee sitting inside the passenger
compartment of his vehicle.5" Thornton's admission that he was close
to the car temporally and spatially was particularly persuasive to the
majority.54 The Court exhibited great concern for safety of the officer.55 Stating that a search could only be conducted when the vehicle's
recent occupant had been arrested and that the danger posed to the
arresting officer came from the stress of the arrest itself, the majority
was persuaded that stress was not reduced merely because the arrestee
was first approached while out of his vehicle. 5' The majority also
stated that the arrestee being outside of his vehicle did not make it less
likely that the arrestee might "lunge for a weapon or ... destroy
evidence if he [was] outside of, but still in control of, the vehicle."5"
The majority's primary concern was the safety of the arresting officer,
and the Court sought to establish a clear rule to govern all search
incident to arrest situations.5 8 The practical effect of the majority's
opinion is to help prevent circumstances in which the arresting officer
is forced to guess when he first initiated contact with the arrestee.59
To accomplish that objective, the majority held that to satisfy the new
rule presented in Thornton, the arrestee need only be a recent occupant
of the car that is the subject of the search.6 °

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 2129.
Id. at 2130-31 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).
Id. at 2131-32.
Id.
Id. at 2130, 2132.
Id. at 2131.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2132.
Id.
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O'Connor Concurrence
Justice O'Connor, concurring, wrote that she joined in all but footnote
four of the majority's opinion.61 Justice O'Connor expressed dissatisfaction with the state of search incident to arrest law.62 Furthermore,
Justice O'Connor expressed disapproval of the fact that many lower
court decisions "treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest

A.

. . . as a police entitlement rather than an exception," justified by the

desire to protect the arresting officer and possible evidence. 3 Justice
O'Connor would have adopted Justice Scalia's point of view had the
parties addressed the issue of allowing searches when the search was
relevant to the cause of the arrest (in this case the vehicle could be
searched because of the discovery of marijuana on Thornton's person).64
Scalia and Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, also concurring, expressed their
displeasure with the majority's extension of the search incident to arrest
exception. 65 First, they emphasized the ridiculous notion that a
handcuffed suspect could break free of handcuffs, get out of a locked
squad car, and then make it to a weapon or a piece of evidence located
in a vehicle.66 Second, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg contended that
because the arrestee had been handcuffed and placed in the back of the
police car, the danger to the arresting officer or the evidence ceased to
exist. 7 Therefore, the conditions justifying the search incident to
arrest exception were no longer present.6 8 Third, they rebutted the
notion that Belton searches are reasonable by addressing the frequency
with which searches are conducted while the arrestee is handcuffed in
the back of a police car.6 9 Justices Scalia and Ginsburg asserted that
the passenger compartment of the arrestee's car was simply not within
his reach when the arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a police
B.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 2133 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2133, 2137-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2133 (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 2134-35 (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 2135 (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
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car.7" Thus, in the present case, a Belton search was not justifiable if
Belton was truly based on a fear of danger to an officer or evidence.71
In an effort to avoid advocating the complete abandonment of Belton,
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg attempted to recast Belton, so that Belton
searches do not depend on Chimel's desire to protect officers or
evidence.72 If Belton searches are justifiable, Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg argued that they are so because the search would have been
constitutional on the ground that it was relevant to the crime for which
the arrestee was arrested.7 3 The basis of their argument comes from
United States v. Rabinowitz,7 4 which relied on the police officer's
general interest in gathering evidence related to the crime for which the
arrestee was arrested and not on a desire to prevent concealment or
destruction of evidence.75 Justices Scalia and Ginsburg would have
determined the search was constitutional because the arresting officer
had reason to believe more contraband was located in the car.76
C.

Stevens and Souter's Dissent

Justices Stevens and Souter, dissenting, believed that Belton's basis
for expanding Chimel was not a concern for police officer safety, but
instead the need to create a straightforward rule that could be easily
applied and enforced. 77 They argued that the majority only muddied
the clarity established by Belton when it extended the rule to circumstances in which the arrestee was first approached while outside of his
car.78 Furthermore, Justices Stevens and Souter stated that Belton's
bright-line rule "is not needed for cases in which the arrestee is first
accosted when he is a pedestrian."79 Because the bright-line rule from
Belton is not necessary in a case involving a suspect who has exited a
vehicle, Justices Stevens and Souter claimed Chimel provided all the
guidance necessary for arresting officers in such circumstances, "[t]he
...rule should provide the same protection to a 'recent occupant' of a
vehicle as to a recent occupant of a house."80 Justices Stevens and
Souter believed the only justification in the present case for extending

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 2135-36 (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Id. at 60-64.
Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2137-38 (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 2138 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2139 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2140 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
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Belton was the interest in uncovering all possible evidence."' The
Justices further stated that the privacy interests guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment must trump an arresting officer's desire to obtain all
the possible evidence without waiting for a warrant. 82
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The consequences of Thornton are that police officers have the liberty
to arrest a suspect who is not in his car and then, without a warrant,
search the vehicle for evidence to bolster whatever cause led to the
initial arrest. Presumably, this extension will allow the officers to
proceed with caution because they need not rush to approach the suspect
to get him before he exits the vehicle. However, as the concurring
opinion of Justices Scalia and Ginsburg points out, once the suspect is
arrested and moved away from the vehicle, the true threat of danger
from that suspect, at least for Belton purposes, is over.
Additionally, the holding in Thornton does not enhance or clarify the
all-important bright-line rule established by Belton. Prior to Thornton,
the arresting officer only needed to decide if he had approached the
arrestee while he was still in the vehicle. After Thornton, an arresting
officer must determine what is a "recent occupant" before conducting a
search for weapons or evidence. It is the ambiguity created by the new
"recent occupant" standard that will be Thornton's most problematic
impact. By applying the holding in Thornton, one can easily imagine a
situation in which the arrestee's vehicle is searched even though he had
not been in the vehicle that day. Imagine that a suspect, while
approaching a vehicle, reaches for the door handle to his car just as a
police officer accosts him. Subsequently, the suspect is arrested. Now
what is to prevent the officer from searching the car under Thornton?
The "recent occupant" standard seems rather dubious in this case
because the arrestee could lunge into the passenger compartment to
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. The fact that he is about to enter
the car rather than just recently exited should be of no import if the
basis for the extension truly is a concern for the safety of officers and the
preservation of evidence. It is only a matter of time before the new
Thornton standard is extended.
Thornton only continues the trend of minimizing the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of an individual. Search incident to arrest is
becoming the norm and not the exception to the rule. In fact, Thornton
may have stretched the exception of search incident to arrest past the

81. Id. (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
82.

Id. (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
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breaking point. Furthermore, police officers had already played fast and
loose with the more restrictive Belton rule as the concurring opinions of
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburg highlight. According to these
Justices, it was already standard practice for police officers to arrest the
occupant of a car, place that occupant in handcuffs, in the back of a
police car, and then conduct a search of the arrestee's vehicle. The
Court's holding in Thornton will only further erode the citizens' privacy
rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
JASON LEWIS

